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3 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: I'd like to call the hearing to 
4 order and wish you a good morning and welcome you to the 
5 hearing on the Involvement of the University of California in 
6 the Management of the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos 
7 National Laboratories. Today's hearing is co-sponsored by 
8 the Senate Health and Human Services Committee and 
9 Assemblyman John Vasconcellos. 
10 I would like to introduce the members that are here 
11 at the current time. Over on my far left and your right is 
12 Assemblyman Torn Hayden. Next to him is Senator Bill 
13 Campbell. Next to him is Senator Ken Maddy. Assemblyman 
14 John Vasconcellos, who is a co-sponsor, and Senator Hersch 
15 Rosenthal on my right and your left. 
16 I want to thank you and inform the audience and the 
17 witnesses that members will come and go during the course of 
18 the hearing, which goes from 10:00 to 4:00. We will break 
19 somewhere around the noon hour for an hour, hour and fifteen 
20 minutes. We'd like to invite the audience to stay with us 
21 until the end of the hearing if they may. 
22 Members of the Committee, the various witnesses have 
23 asked that, if you can, you would hold questions until the 
24 end of the panel. If there is a burning issue you want to 
25 raise, then we'll recognize you. But it's a feeling that 
26 most of the information will be given during the course of 
27 panel. 
28 I want to extend my special appreciation to the 






















1 employ roughly 18,000 University of California staff. 
2 There has long been debate centering on the 
3 University's management of the laboratories. Although a 
4 majority of Regents have reapproved the contract each time it 
5 has come up, there has never been a consensus among faculty, 
6 students or the general public about the appropriateness of 
7 the University's involvement. 
8 The key issues that will be discussed here today 
9 center around several major themes: First, do the labs 
10 support the concept of a comprehensive nuclear test ban? If 
11 not, why not? 
12 Second, to what extent are arguments about the 
13 alleged unreliability of surveillance of a nuclear treaty 
14 based on scientific fact or to what extent are they based 
15 upon political considerations? 
16 Third, to what extent do the labs attempt to 
17 influence federal policy on nuclear weapons development and 
18 testing? 
19 Fourth, just what are the labs doing? Are they 
20 testing existing weapons for reliability to see if they work 
21 or are they developing new Star Wars laser technology? Is 
22 what they're doing consistent with the support of the last 
23 five presidential administrations for a comprehensive test 
24 ban treaty? 
25 Fifth, should the management of the Jabs be under 
26 the auspices of a highly respected educational institution 
27 like the University of California? If so, should the 
28 University and the Legislature have any greater control or 
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1 California, how their health and safety is involved. 
2 So, this might be the first of similar hearings. We 
3 might find that we have enough information that we might want 
4 to move into public policy. That is still yet undecided. 
5 So, that's what our hearing is about and I thank all of you 
6 for coming. I'd like now to call on our co-sponsor, 
7 Assemblyman Vasconcellos, for a few remarks. 
8 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: I simply want to have us 
9 begin the hearing. It seems to me that the University of 
10 California is a public institution with the public trust of 
11 the people of California and I believe the people have the 
12 right to know what is happening and to find out whether in 
13 fact the University is operating in a way that is carrying 
14 out this public trust. These scientists, who are the 
15 experts, are best prepared to advise us and the public about 
16 what's happening and the appropriateness of it and I'm here 
17 to hear what you have to say. 
18 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Senator Campbell. 
19 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Just before we begin, Madam 
20 Chairwoman. Are we going to stick strictly to the parameters 
21 of the role of the University in relation to the labs or are 
22 we going to make it much more broad based than that? 
23 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Let me give you a description 
24 of how it's structured for today. 
25 SENATOR CAMPBELL: I just wondered what the 
26 parameters are that we're going to discuss. 
27 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We're going to stick pretty 
28 much to the topic that is described in your agenda. The 
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1 has gone forward. We will try to stick as much as possible 
2 to the agenda so we can get through all of our witnesses in a 
3 timely fashion. 
4 I'd like to call on first Dr. William R. Frazer, 
5 Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs with the 
6 University of California. 
7 Dr. Frazer. 
8 DR. FRAZER: Thank you, Madam Chair, members. I'll 
9 do my best on this --
10 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Would you reintroduce yourself. 
11 DR. FRAZER: I'm sorry. William Frazer, University 
12 of California, Senior Vice Present for Academic Affairs. 
13 I'll do my best to present the University's views on 
14 this broad topic you have before you today. I will deal with 
15 the relationship between the University and the laboratories 
16 at Los Alamos and Livermore. 
17 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Excuse me, Dr. Frazer. I'd 
18 like to also introduce to the audience Senator Dan 
19 McCorquodale, who has joined us. 
20 Proceed. 
21 DR. FRAZER: I believe it would be helpful to your 
22 Committee if I described three very important aspects of the 
23 relationship: The responsibilities and authorities of the 
24 several parties involved, the rationale for the operation of 
25 these laboratories by the University, and the means by which 
26 the University carries out its contractual responsibilities 
27 in managing the labs. The third of those topics I'll save 
28 for Panel III in the afternoon. 
'------- ---------- -- --------
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1 and in isolating personnel from the politically-driven 
2 processes of government. I'll speak further on that subject 
3 later. 
4 It's the responsibility of the University to manage 
5 the laboratories according to our personnel and management 
6 policies, to carry out the nuclear weapons program as 
7 established by the federal government and to ensure that the 
8 laboratories execute the technical programs with the highest 
9 possible quality. The staffs of the laboratories are 
10 University employees. 
11 The University does not establish the goals or the 
12 general content of the research and development programs that 
13 are performed at the laboratories. This is true for both the 
14 nuclear weapons programs and the other programs that the 
15 laboratories conduct. The programmatic content is 
16 established, at a high level of aggregation, by the federal 
17 budget process. The tasks to be done are then defined at a 
18 greater level of detail by Department of Energy officials 
19 within the broadly-defined mandate of the legislation. The 
20 scientific and technical execution is done by the 
21 laboratories. Initiative is expected and much flexibility is 
22 allowed. 
23 The process I just described is not always 
24 completely descriptive of how the system works. The 
25 laboratories are and are expected to be far more than mere 
26 executors of orders. New technical developments made by the 
27 laboratories have often led to new weapons systems of 
28 qualitatively different capability. But the role of the 
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1 of numerous inquiries and reports and was most recently 
2 discussed and very thor y discussed the Board of 
3 Regents of the Un sity over the course of about a year 
4 before they decided last September to seek renewal of the 
5 contract. 
6 In their consideration of continuing the 
7 association, the Regents of the University have emphasized 
8 that the chief reason for doing so is public service, one of 
9 the missions of the University. It is their belief that the 
10 University serves an important national interest through its 
11 management of the laboratories and through its oversight of 
12 the conduct of various research programs, including national 
13 security. 
14 The University performs this public service in 
15 managing the laboratories n such a way that their programs 
16 and personnel are of ex lent quality. The University 
17 brings to the laboratories the tradition of debate and 
18 intellectual questioning by providing an environment in which 
19 the scientists of the laboratories provide policymakers with 
20 a source of independent technical advice. 
21 The s are keenly aware that the association is 
22 not without adverse fects. Some criticize the University 
23 for its association wi weapons of mass destruction. Others 
24 assert that it's si not job of a great university to 
25 
26 
be involved in act ties so far from mainstream of 
Un ersity activities and such involvement inevitably 
27 hinders the attainment of the University's principal goals. 
28 In their most ecent consi ration of the 


















1 management has served this end to 
2 date. We ieve this combination 
3 should be preserved." 
4 I'll continue my remarks in the afternoon. 
5 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you, Dr. Frazer. 
6 I would now like to call up Dr. Paul White from the 
7 Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamitos (sic) 
8 National Laboratory. 
9 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Madam Chair, did you want to wait 
10 until the whole panel has finished before we ask questions? 
11 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We would prefer to do it that 
12 way unless there's some ng that --
13 Let me correct my pronunciation. Los Alamos. 
14 Dr. White. 
15 DR. WHITE: I'm Dr. Paul C. White, Associate 
16 Director of the Center for National Security Studies at Los 
17 Alamos National atory. 
18 Madam Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it's a 
19 pleasure to re wi colleagues to tell you a 
20 little bit about certain aspects of the nuclear weapons 
21 program conducted at the national laboratories operated for 
22 the Department of Energy by the University of California. 
23 In particular, I d like to review from the 
24 laboratories' point of view how it is that these laboratories 
25 have derived ir responsibilities in this area of such 
26 great national importance. I shall strive to make clear to 
27 you those areas of r sibilities that are sharply defined 
28 for the laboratories by Uni States policy and law and 
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1 concern to deter nuclear conflict in particular. 
2 Safe, secure, reli e fective nuclear weapons 
3 are central to success in achieving this goal of deterrence. 
4 The United States policy has developed over the years a set 
5 of requirements for the nuclear forces necessary to implement 
6 the various objectives of this deterrent policy. These 
7 include, of course, the deterrence of general nuclear war. 
8 They also include the coordinated deployment of nuclear 
9 forces together with conventional forces to deter 
10 conventional conflict. 
11 The implementation of this particular u.s. policy 
12 objective is seen most clearly in the European theater, where 
13 so-called tactical nuclear forces are used in combination 
14 with NATO conventional forces to offset certain foreign power 
15 advantages in conventional forces. Our national security 
16 policy has so far been succes ul in each of these areas. 
17 United States policy has, however, consistently 
18 looked beyond the status quo. A major goal of current and 
19 past policy has been to look toward a future with less 
20 reliance on nuclear weapons. In various ways every 
21 administration wi responsibility for nuclear weapons has 
22 pursued this goal. Each has defined a set of arms control 
23 objectives to reduce the lik ihood of nuclear conflict and 
24 to limit the numbers of nuclear weapons. 
25 Some administrations have sought to enhance the 
26 capabilities of conventional forces in order to provide 
27 alternative means to deal with possible confrontations. The 
28 current administration s encouraged research into the 



























1 development and testing effort are to explore and provide new 
2 
3 
technologies necessa t maintai U.S. nuclear deterrent 
forces and to maintain a ue nati capability to 
4 design, test and monitor U.S. nuclear arsenal for 
5 reliability, safety, securi and effectiveness ••• " 
6 The congressional language goes on specifically to 
7 charge the 1 atories to continue conceptual studies on 
8 certain authorized new weapon systems such as, for example, 
9 the warhead for the new small ICBM. 
10 
11 
Looking further towards future, the laboratories 
are specifically char to conduct " .•• research on the 
12 feasibility of innovative ications of nuclear technology 
13 that may eventual tant." One particular example in 
14 this area is work in support of the Strategic Defense 








addition, to r i States against the possibility 
sur ise an sary. 
ress on to tail e nature of the 
of technologi 
The 
nuclear testing ram in support of these broader programs. 
The laboratories, t tment of Energy, are 
to conduct a ear ice tests during fiscal 
year 1987 and ic to prepare testing in future 
23 years. These nuclear test are expressly to be related to 
24 "proof-of " " termination of the 
25 state-of-the-art", "rna ntenance of stockpile reliability" and 
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In fulfilling these responsibilities to the future, 
the laboratories have programs ined to explore advanced 
3 concepts for ication of nuclear weapons science. 
4 Through this effort, the limits of technology are made known 
5 and the most advanced capability is made available to support 
6 national need. In addition, each of these program areas 
7 requires the latest scientific understanding derived from 
8 vigorous research in such key fundamental areas as materials 
9 science, high explosives science, computational science and a 
10 whole spectrum of fundamental scientific research. 
11 The weapons development programs that I've just 
12 described deserve a bit of elaboration in the context of this 
13 hearing. In e r ible ct of these programs, the 
14 nuclear weapons laboratories maintain a early defined set 





igns must strive to meet criteria for 
are consultation between 
18 military planners laboratory representatives 
19 knowledgeable about the limits of nuclear weapon design 
20 capability. But these criteria are only approached to the 
21 extent permitted itional requirements of nuclear 
22 safety and security. 
23 Furthermore, in attempting to satisfy these 
24 objectives, scientists and engineers draw upon all available 
25 technical understanding to ensure that weapons are designed 
26 for maximum operati reliability and maximum stockpile 
27 life. 
28 In addition I should like to point out that these 
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nuclear experiments and combined with a technical review 
process assures st rds ex lence to be 
expected from laboratories associated with the University of 
California. 
These standards of excellence also assure the 
quality of support for e U S. national security policy of 
of nuclear deterrence so that at e same time the other 
policy goals of reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons can 
be pursued. 
Thank very much for is opportunity to speak 
with you this morning. At the appropriate time I'd be happy 
to participate in ions. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you, Dr. White. 
I'd like to now call on Dr. Paul s. Brown, Assistant 
Associate Director for Arms Control with the Lawrence 
ratory. Livermore National 
DR. BROWN: you, Madam irman. My name is 
Paul Brown. I'm 
Laboratory. 
Lawrence L vermore National 
You intr us earlier, some of us, as 
administrators from weapons 1 
we are. But I would also ike to 
atories. Indeed, that 
asize that Dr. White 
and I are also scientists wi 
weapons program. We'd 
along those lines. I will 
research and 
years experience in the 
to answer any questions later 
talking about nuclear weapons 
e role of nuclear testing. 
27 In recent years re have increasing pressures 
28 for more restri 1 ts on nuclear testing, including a 















































assess the vulnerability of weapons to the nuclear threat 
environment the weapons of our saries; and, 
fourth, to avoid technological sur ise by maintaining the 
scientific judgment necessary to assess the significance of 
real or claimed advances in weapons technology, both nuclear 
and non-nuclear. 
I will address reasons in order. First 
of all, stockpile reliability. 
Within the constraints of the military requirements, 
the weapons in the stockpile and currently under development 
have been conservatively designed to avoid as best possible 
the adverse effects of aging. Correcting a problem in the 
stockpile is extremely expensive and time consuming. 
Scientists and engineers strive to make their designs durable 
and robust against all foreseeable conditions encountered in 
the course a weapon's existence. 
Nuclear weapons, however, are complex mechanisms 
made of highly react materials and sometimes of necessity 
they include materials of limited lifetimes. Because of 
these characteristics, have occurred in stockpiled 
weapons that have raised question of whether a weapon 
would perform as designed. In most cases scientists have 
been able to assess and fix these problems without nuclear 
tests. In doing so, 
judgment that was ba 
design testing. 
on 
ey drew upon technical 
rs of experience in nuclear 
27 Nuclear tests, however, have been necessary to fix 
28 problems. Since 1958 one- ird of all weapon designs placed 
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1 specified low temperature extreme, a weapon that had already 
2 gone to e a smal fraction of 
3 yield. It dud. It necessitated a design 
4 change and another test. 
5 It has ear weapons can be 
6 designed to more r to effects of ing. They can 
be. However, it must be recogniz 7 n specifying the 
8 requirements for new nuclear warheads, the Department of 
9 Defense prepares a set military characteristics, known 
10 otherwise as MCs t ine the requirements. These 
11 requirements include first and foremost nuclear safety and 
12 then in order iori si e utonium 
13 dispersal saf , yi d so on. 
14 In the event that compliance with the MCs leads to a 
15 sign conflict, tment of Defense r ires that 
16 priorities obse in or r I just listed. 
17 ere is an MC for e endurance and 
18 repl ili . I is 1 a sirable goal out to 
19 as opposed to a r i ement, conti on meeting all the 
20 other MCs. 
21 I 11 now ess st ile modernization. 
str ic ance is constantly changing. 22 
23 New technologies and developments, nuclear and 
24 non-nuclear, can cr ibili survivability of 
25 the u.s. rrent. al credibility and 
26 survivab ity. 
27 tension these two fects leads to a 
28 narnic deterrent i nat ons. In turn, this 
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advocates in Congress 
Congressman miss 
some people have even dubbed it the 
f d the u.s. stockpile 
is excellent. s success is in large part to our 
survivable warheads and continuing efforts to 
to modernize stockp e 
security features new 
e 
incorporating new safety and 
existing weapons. I'd like to 
point out that only one-third of our stockpiled weapons have 
these modern safety and security features. 
I'd like to emphasize that no weapon accident has 
ever produced ear yield. However, in two overseas 
airplane crashes the hi OS in the weapons reacted 
violently, dispersing utonium -- whi is an extremely 
toxic material 
was no nuclear 
into 
d But 
acceptable lev s was extr 
vicini of the crashes. There 
utonium to 
and the political 
ite serious. 
L rmore Los Alamos 
sensit high explosive that 
e in a variety of weapon systems. 
To aver 
scientists devel 
is now entering 
Insensit osive is extr difficult to detonate 
in the event of an ace 
bullet or an ai 
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1 of e Defense Nuclear Agency is 



















Assessment of weapon performance rests on scientific 
2 judgment on nuclear experience. This judgment 
3 takes consi e to is cultivated by the 
4 application of theory and to device design and it 
5 is continually refined on basis of data from nuclear 
6 tests. 
7 Removing the confirmation ovided by tests would 
8 result in the overextension of judgment and the reduced 
9 credibility of the nation's deterrent. This indeed was the 
10 case during the moratorium that existed between 1958 and '61. 
11 In conclusion, I would like to say that there are 
12 many who view a Comprehensive Test Ban as a top priority arms 
13 control measure. I believe that there are other arms control 
14 measures which should take precedence. These include major 
15 reductions in e most destabilizing weapon systems. Such 
16 reductions can ieved e at the same time introducing 
17 more modern weapons ch are safer, more secure, more 
18 survivable and more ilizing. This is the approach we 
19 should take in Geneva and I believe it will require continued 
20 nuclear testing. 
21 The issues r rdi ear testing must be 
22 addressed head-on wi ss, but with caution. The 
23 government has under an tant approa to this 
24 purpose. We met four t s nee last July with the 
25 Soviets at the Nuclear Test Experts Meetings in Geneva to 
26 discuss the broad range of ssues relevant to nuclear 
27 testing. I myself parti pated in the first three of those 
28 meetings. Current , we e Soviets are trying to 
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Since then I've been a number of terms on the 
President's Science Advisory ttee and a consultant to 
e current one on such every administration incl 
matters. 
ng 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Dr. Garwin, would you pull that 
microphone closer to you, ease. 
DR. GARWIN: Yes. 
So, let me just say that I believe that we will have 
to rely on nuclear weapons for a long time, for many decades, 
and we will need people who understand them and who are 
motivated to work with them. 
That said, though, we do not need nuclear tests to 
maintain the existing types of nuclear weapons reliable or to 
adapt them to new delivery means such as the Midgetman 
missile. Here I disagree th the previous speaker. 
I think a total ban on nuclear explosion tests is in 
our interest and can be adequately verified by cooperative 
seismic means to a yield less than one kiloton, some 
one-twentieth of the yield of the first atomic bombs. 
You've not 
to why we would want a 
d one word in this hearing so far as 
on nuclear testing. so, I have to 
reveal the dirty secret that our purpose in stopping nuclear 
tests would be to 
not of our own; to st 
evolution of the Soviet threat, 
e Soviet Union from developing 
x-ray laser weapons, for instance, and to the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons other nations. 
So, the question is not is stopping nuclear tests in 
our interest, it is whether it is in our net interests. You 
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1 ensuring that all voices are heard, that the materials 
2 the information produced in the laboratories are available to 
3 support all options which could be considered by our 
4 political leaders. 
5 Now, there are some special questions which are 
6 involved and one of them, for instance, is whether nuclear 
7 explosion tests are necessary to maintain stockpile 
8 reliability. Much has been written on this subject, but in 
9 my opinion much of it is misleading. 
10 I think that one cannot accept what Dr. White said 
11 in that we have the highest reliability, highest standards of 
12 excellence in our nuclear weapons program and still refer to 
13 the sorry state of the nuclear stockpile following the 
14 introduction of weapons developed during the moratorium. 
15 In my opinion that was irresponsible. Weapons 
16 should not be introduced into the stockpile until they have 
17 been proof tested in their manufactured version. So, when I 
18 talk about continued r iability of stockpiled weapons, I'm 
19 talking, of course, about weapons that have had their proof 
20 test in the production version. 
21 Those weapons do not need nuclear testing, do not 
22 receive nuclear testing to ensure that they will continue to 
23 work. If you imagine how many nuclear tests are required by 
24 nuclear tests alone to demonstrate 99 percent reliability or 
25 even 90 percent reliability for the various weapons that we 
26 have in stockpile, it is an enormous number. 
27 You have heard also that the weapons could be 
28 remanufactured when non-nuclear inspection shows that they 
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1 surface-to-air Navy missile. An existing warhead would fit \ 
2 the operating characteristics required, except it was two 
3 inches too long to fit into the missile compartment 
4 designated for the warhead. The Department of Defense 
5 refused to reconfigure the sketch so as to accept the 
6 existing warhead and a $200 million weapon development was 
7 undertaken simply because of the bureaucratic rigidity. That 
8 is not in the interests of our security no matter how much 
9 one may like the expenditure of $200 million for a warhead. 
10 The question of insensitive high explosive. We've 
11 known about this for a long time. Only 40 percent of our 
12 existing weapons have insensitive high explosive. We've had 
13 no limitation on nuclear tests so far. If insensitive high 
14 explosive incorporation into the stockpile is so important 
15 that we cannot accept a test ban limiting Soviet development, 
16 why have we not hastened to put it into the stockpile 
17 already? Why are we delaying its advent so that it can be 
18 entered into a stockpile in the routine evolution of these 
19 capabilities? 
20 Finally, when we launch people into space, we do not 
21 redesign the people. We package them so they can be sent up 
22 and brought down safely for the most part. So it is with the 
23 Midgetman missile. The W87 warhead is already tested. It 
24 could be adapted to the Midgetman missile. Depending upon 
25 the basing mode, the Midgetman would have to require 
26 packaging of this warhead to bring its vibration shock 
27 temperature surges down to those for which the warhead have 
28 i been designed. 
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1 One might denigrate or perhaps for that matter honor 
2 the missile by call t Congressman missile, but it 
3 certainly doesn't help rational discourse about it. 
4 You do not r on the Midgetman missile the most 
5 appropriate way of basing that missile, which is to put it in 
6 silos. Why don't you hear it? Because it would be too 
7 cheap. It would be too big a competitor under those 
8 circumstances putting a single warhead missile with the 
9 existing MX warhead in a silo so that it would be 
10 self-protecting so that to destroy one warhead on our side 
11 would require the expenditure by the Soviet Union of what is 
12 generally reckoned as at least two more heads on their side. 
13 The laboratories are not doing their job in my 
14 opinion when they do not make studies to show that such a 
15 weapon could be obtained soon and at low cost with existing 
16 components even if we lost the interest which comes from the 
17 development new technology. 
18 Now, the Soviet bombs, I have no idea whether they 
19 will survive wi non-nuclear inspection and 
20 remanufacture. I thi we can count on the Soviet Union to 
21 monitor and maintain eir own stockpile. I think that we 
22 count on our nuclear weapon establishment to do that, also. 
23 The former director of Los Alamos previously 
24 maintained -- that is, Harold Agnew -- that he did not need 
25 nuclear testing to mai n stockpile reliability, but only a 
26 sufficient amount a non-nuclear inspection 
27 program and exemption from the Occupational Safety and Health 
28 Act. 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
1 Eventually, Dr. changed his public view. But 
2 that was not use his judgment. It 
3 was because he felt ava ab i of money for these 
4 programs and priori would not be assured without a costly 
5 nuclear testing program. 
6 In answer to the question which was given to me, the 
7 second question: Apart from bomb-driven beam weapons, do I 
8 foresee the day when bomb production will become strictly an 
9 industry devoid of the need for innovative design. 
10 There's not much you can do in innovative design if 
11 you are not having nuclear tests to verify it. I would 
12 object to the intr ion into stockpile of a nuclear weapon 
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received from a Congressman to evaluate some of the evidence 
that the Lawrence L e at had presented to the 
u.s. Congress in late 1985 having to do with the need to 
continue nuclear weapons testing in order to maintain the 
stockpile. 
I've evaluated the evidence that the Lawrence 
Livermore Laboratory has submitted -- at least all the 
evidence that's come to my attention at this time -- and I'm 
going to talk about that very briefly now. Then this 
afternoon in the second panel I will try to answer the 
question: What has all this got to do with the University of 
California and the State of California? 
So, wi that introduction and sort of outline of 
1 what I'm going to do, let me proceed. All of this will be 
submitted as part the record. 
The nuclear 
on a recitation of oblems 
laboratories have been relying 
been encountered over 
18 the years with stockpiled nuclear weapons to support their 
19 contention that continued nuclear explosive testing is 
20 necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability of the 
21 existing stockpile of nuclear weapons. 
22 Six examples of such problems were described in an 
23 unclassified 1983 study by a Department of Energy contractor 
24 entitled "Some Little-Publicized Difficulties with a Nuclear 
25 Freeze." This study has received considerable publicity and 
26 is commonly referred to as the Rosengren Report, the reason 
27 obviously being its author was named Rosengren. 
28 The report was submitt into the record of the 
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of R&D Associates, is titled "Some 
Little-Publ ci Difficulties with 
a Nuclear Freeze." It argues t 
judging from past experiences, a 
ban on the underground testing of 
nuclear weapons could be expected 
to sever undercut the capability 
of the United States to maintain a 
reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. 
This study has been submitted into 
the record of at least three 
Congressional hearings on the test 
ban and was the subject of a front 
page article in the Washington 
~." 
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In other words, I want to emphasize strongly that 
this particular report by Rosengren was used not by 
Rosengren, who was merely the contractor that did the work 
for the DOE, but it was used on a number of occasions by the 
Department of Energy and by officials from the weapons 
21 laboratories for the spec ic purpose of supporting their 
22 contention that nuclear testing would need to be continued to 
23 maintain confidence in the stockpile. so, this is not just a 
24 report off in left field somewhere. 
25 Now I'm going back to Representat e Markey again. 
26 He says: 
27 
28 
"While I am not a nuclear weapons 
t, own r of e 

































explosive testing is necessary to 
maintain confidence in the 
reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
stockpile of existing, thoroughly 
tested nuclear weapons. Do you 
6 believe that there were then and 
7 are today alternative means 
8 available to identify and correct 
9 stockpile problems as they arise?" 
10 Now, Dr. Garwin has just discussed some of the 
11 alternative means available to identify these problems, but 
12 let me simply go on and tell you what my evaluation was and 
13 the results that I communicated then to Congressman Markey. 
14 Now, I must say that he started out by saying he 
15 wasn't a nuclear weapons experts, which he's not. My 
43 
16 conclusion, having read this letter and having looked at the 
17 question that he asked me in some detail, was that he was a 
18 very perceptive man indeed. So, let me proceed then to just 
19 say a few words about what I found out. 
20 Now, my evaluation of this report, the Rosengren 
21 Report, that Markey asked me for is here. I'll leave that 
22 with you with the rest of the copy of the statement. I want 
23 to read just a very short section of this at the beginning of 
24 it so you'll know what it's about and the conclusions. 
25 It says: 
26 "Over the past several months, 
27 Administration officials have 
28 frequently cited an unclassified 


























stockpile. They are: 
"The W45 tacti nuclear 
3 weapon 
4 "The W47 first Polaris 
5 missile warhead 
6 "The W52 Sergeant missile 
7 warhead 
8 "The W56 Minuteman missile 
9 warhead 
10 "The W58 second Polaris 
11 missile warhead 
12 "The W68 first Poseidon 
13 missile warhead 
14 "The question we address in this 
15 evaluation is: ••• "And this is 
16 important, I think, to be accurate 
17 about it. "Do the examples cited 
18 in the Rosengren Report support the 
19 thesis that nuclear explosive 
20 testing is necessary to maintain 
21 confidence in the reliability of 
22 the existing u.s. nuclear stockpile 
23 of thoroughly tested nuclear 
24 weapons." 
25 That's the precise language that was used by 
26 Congressman Markey in addressing that question to me. 
45 
27 Now I'll simply read the conclusions of this report 
28 that I submitted to him. 












ing to do with 
ex at. 
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1 Now, there were two other examples which carne to my 
2 attention this time as a result of an inquiry by Frederick 
3 Reines, Professor Reines, who is the chairman of the 
4 Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee of the University 
5 of California. I just want to refer to those two additional 
6 examples and then that would finish my statement for this 
7 rnor ning. 
8 Two additional examples were presented by Roger 
9 Batzel in a classified addendum to his testimony at the 
10 September 18th congressional hearing I have referred to 
11 earlier. At the request of Professor Frederick Reines, 
12 chairman of the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee of 
13 the University of California, I included these two additional 
14 examples in my evaluation, bringing to eight the total number 
15 of examples considered. 
16 None supported the thesis stated in Congressman 
17 Markey's question. No ear tests were required either to 
18 identify or correct problems encountered in stockpile 
19 ' with three of these eight examples -- the 56, 58 and 68. 
20 Incomplete testing prior to being stockpiled 
21 accounts for the difficulties encountered with the remaining 
22 five. Each of these five fall into one of four main ways in 
23 which an incomplete testing program has led to unreliable 
24 weapons. The four ways are: (a) modifying stockpiled 
25 weapons without nuclear proof tests; (b) rushing new weapon 
26 designs into the stockpile without thorough testingi (c) 
27 failure to test the version of the warhead as it is actually 
28 deployed; and (d) failure to test for the effects of the 
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1 been able to come up with simply doesn't prove their point, 
e reasons that's so. 2 
3 
in my view, and I've ven 
I'm sorry that is been somewhat of a technical 
4 statement on my part. is afternoon I think I'll get away 
5 from that and get down to the University of California more 
6 directly and the relationship with the University and the 
7 labs and the State Cal or a. 
8 But I want , first of all, to lay the groundwork to 
9 be sure you understood that people have looked at the 
10 
11 
evidence and don't agree wi 
weapons laboratories come to 
conclusions that the 
ing to do with the need 
12 for continued nuclear weapons testing. Thank you very much. 
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Survey, Menlo Park, 
point out, I'm here 
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esently employed for the u.s Geological 
ifor a. For obv -- as we all 
as a citizen and my views 
of the u.s. Geological Survey. But 
as an American tizen wi rst Amendment rights, I can 
speak my peace. 
I guess I should clear my status here so that 
my testimony will not be misconstrued. I was a professor at 
the University of Cal ornia for 12 years, attaining a full 
professorship status tment Geology and 
Geophysics. I must admit for those years I joined in the 
opinion of virt eve er of the Academic 




















































self-imposed, unilateral, 18-month-long nuclear test 
moratorium? I'm ite certain Dav d ree the answer 
is clear un i e Soviets have not cheated on that 
moratorium. They have indeed not tested during that 
timeframe. 
From then on the comments get more specific to the 
issue here. Even or the discussion 
today has appeared to be largely based on whether the u.s. 
should or should not -- or the arguments for and against a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, everything here today is still 
fundamentally to link the role of the University in its 
oversight status and from our -- or at least from mine -- has 
the Unversity perf n that status. 
It seems to me from discussions today between 
the gentlemen at two of is table that if it is the 
role of the Un si or the Un ty conceives its role 
as that of public interest and that is it is continuing 
supervision of e 1 atories, it has early failed in 
that study. Because the variety of spute which is 
given here today-- which is not a dispute. It's a dispute 
which has continued over years -- it seems to me that any 
22 oversight committee d 1 since held intense 
23 hearing on these issues to t and decide whether the 
24 gentlemen immedi to my right or such as Ray 
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lemen at the 
em why they 
to 
s able to thwart 
6 362-2345 
1 gentlemen, who had nothing to do with the research that went 
2 into that paper, asserted were forced to put their 
3 names on document. 
4 That document was intended to document the reality 
5 of a certain mode of evading seismological capabilities under 
6 a test ban treaty. At the time of publication of that 
7 
8 
document we had r r 
supposed technical problem. 
at a ution to that 
It was a concept of multiple 
9 explosions. The entire concept of multiple explosions has 
10 since been abandoned use it is easy to detect the fact of 











not a single explosion most certainly not an earthquake. 
There are a couple of other more recent examples. 
really don't think there's any point in going into the 
details. I w 1 if But they, again, are ones 
which, in my opi on, are not forthright statements of the 
scientific status of s ogy. They tend to raise 
objections I i ical invalid, have been 
in literature. 
I 
demonstrated to be i 
So, I must say 
in truth been et 
I do not feel that the labs have 
forthcoming on ese matters. I 
22 mean, I suspect some of over the years that I, 
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review. 
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discussion this morni 
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on technical issues. I'd 
ssues itical 
e. necessity, are 
ions; they're not totally 
5 determined by such factors. There are a great many other 
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21 Basi cal 
appreciated are that 
al 
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sive Test Ban the last two 
stration. So, I had an opportunity 
ki ors at political 
determine the course of 
sic facts may not be 
ere never was a consensus in the 22 
23 Carter administration in favor of a test ban. The President 
24 himself was in favor a test ban, but ere never was a 
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Pres Nat Secur Advisor, Dr. 
1 
2 
3 Ruginski, d not s a test ban nei er did a number 
4 of other persons working in the White House in the National 
5 1 Security Council staff. 
6 So, there was very large-spread opposition to a test 
7 ban. There were e were just to making 
8 sure that it didn't happen. They were opposed to it for 
9 fairly general reasons. Th believed that -- there were 
10 really three. One was that modernization was necessary, 
ll especially as long as we're ng on nuclear tests; that 
12 despite all the work done on seismology, the 
13 question of er or not the Soviets co d cheat was not 
14 resolved to their satisfaction; and they also did not believe 
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the Senate, that the itical situation that would grow out 
of all this siti i li he would 
lose every ng. so, esi concl that he had to 
proceed on all of various arms control efforts that he 
was purs ng in such a as to rna sure that the test ban 
did not come in ahead of t, on which placed a higher 
priority, I ieve te corr 
The question of exactly why the test ban 
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5 DR. BROWN: What I mean by a destabilizing weapon is 
6 one that is perceived e other side as particularly 
7 reateni because th fear it in a 
8 particular crisis in response to a perceived threat. So, it 
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DR. BROWN: e were some examples back then and 
some examples at Dr uded to e was one 
w system n partie that I'll ess. It was a 
warhead call e W52, which was something that was put into 
the stockpile prior to the moratorium and we thought it had 
been thoroughly test we d it as thoroughly as we --
this was done Los Alamos. d it as thoroughly as 
they thought. However, during moratorium a situation 
arose where a significant safety problem carne up. 
Scientists working at Los Alamos with the high 
explosive that's in the trigger of this weapon 
experienced two accidents in whi four people were killed. 
It was judged at t t e hi explos e in this 
warhead was just too sensitive and too dangerous to be 
allowed to be to troops who have to maintain it. 
So, e 
replace the hi 
ision was made during the moratorium to 
os in warhead with one that was 
considered e and it was 
experiments and cal ations. 
SENATOR CAMPBELL: 
explosive. 
on basis non-nuclear 
's your itive high 
22 DR. BROWN: No this was not insensitive high 
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1 non-nuclear means which have fixed problems and we've fixed 
2 most problems over s. 
3 SENATOR CAMPBELL: We have about, what, 8,000 
4 warheads? 
5 DR. BROWN: I can't say what the exact number is, 
6 but it's of the order of thousands. 
7 SENATOR CAMPBELL: What are the other reasons? 
8 DR. BROWN: The other reasons are to determine the 
9 effects of vulnerability of warheads that are being developed 
10 that are in the stockpile to weapons effects, particularly 
11 nuclear weapons effects. 
12 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Can you tell whether the guidance 
13 system of a radar will work when you have a nuclear 
14 explosion? 




SENATOR CAMPBELL: Do you do that through a proof 
test? 
19 DR. BROWN: This is done by the Defense Nuclear 
20 Agency in a test at the Nevada test site where they expose 
21 electronic equipment, rt of the communications warning 
22 system and so on. 
23 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Is all of the testing now done 
24 underground? 
25 DR. BROWN: All is done underground. We have to do 
26 it underground. 
27 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Do the Soviets do any above 
28 ground prior to the test 
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Madam Chairman, thank you 
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1 to state or restate what Dr. Brown said. He said, "I 
2 disagree that testi accel rates e arms race. Test 
3 limitations could res t politi cost as well as ••• " 
4 These are pretty strong statements in support. So, 
5 I don't think your role goes just to the technical advice. 
6 It goes to personal opinion and political advice as well from 
7 what I hear from the people testifying as employees of the uc 
8 system. These are quotes that we've been taking down as we 
9 listen. 
10 DR. FRAZER: Yes, but Dr. Brown is a person with 
11 personal opinions, also. Dr. Brown is getting into some 
12 policy issues here and giving his opinion on them. I 
13 think maybe I should let Dr. Brown get a word in. 
14 DR. BROWN: I also said in my testimony that there 
15 are political advantages to test limitations, that it's our 
16 job at the laboratories to state what the technical costs are 
17 and it's up to the federal government to weigh the costs and 
18 advantages and to make decisions in this area and set policy. 
19 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, you know, there's a fine 
20 line here and we're not all marching down that fine line. 
21 We're crossing over for sonal reasons and University 
22 reasons and so on. We eros for over that line. 
23 So, I want to point that out. 
24 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Assemblyman Bates. 
25 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Yes, thank you. I hope I will be 
26 able to attend this afternoon. So, some of the questions 
27 about the UC role and the relationship of the labs, I hope 
28 we'll get into it at at , too. But let me just make 
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mor exot and all 
feel that the University role in this 
5 is one in which the Defense Department is basically 
6 exploiting for the reasons that the University says they're 
7 
8 
involved. The Universi says 
add a certain amount of prestige. 
ey're involved because they 
I think that's unfortunate 
9 that the University's prestige is in fact being used in this 
10 kind of way. 
11 They also say that they're involved because they can 
12 provide a certain amount of cal personnel. I think 
13 that's unfortunate, too, that those are the reasons why this 
14 makes this a better lab than another. It seems to me that's 
15 a dichotomy the Un sity's role of a free and open 













rather than research that 
humanity. 
So, my ition is 
d lead toward destruction of 
clear on the issue. But 
what I'd like to inquire about is information that relates to 
the testimony this morning. 
First of all, I d li to ask the person who works 
for e -- excuse me, 
opinion today it is pos 
in fact we would know 
Is it your opinion 
would be verifiable? 
Ever about whether in his 
ble to have a test ban treaty that 
ei er side violated the treaty. 
we co d enact a test ban treaty that 
DR. EVERNDEN: Yes. You set threshold. If you 
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1 want verifiable, I'll tell you the seismic network that's 
2 required to it. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: So, it s total possible to 
4 verify it, you're saying. 
5 DR. EVERNDEN: Yes, with the appropriate network. I 
6 just want to make clear that this requires -- at a low 
7 threshold is r res a network inside the Soviet Union. 
8 But our experience with the Soviet Union is they'll accept 
9 this level. 
10 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: The next question I had -- did I 
11 hear testimony, I thought, we had 30,000 warheads? Was that 
12 mentioned by 
13 DR. GARWIN: About 30,000 nuclear weapons, about 
14 11,000 strategic warheads, give or take a few thousand. 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Give or take a few thousand. 
16 I so heard that someone indicated in their 





our ability to 
sufficient deterrent to 
d s icient in terms of 
kind or would be a 
kind of attack that might in fact 
21 occur on our count 
22 
23 
DR. GARWIN: I ink there's general agreement that 
if our warheads are survivable and there's no defense 
24 1 against them, then that number would be adequate. 
25 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Then the question is: Do we 
26 have sufficient nuclear wa right now in stockpile to be 
27 
28 
able to have that 1,000 
new, more exotic k 
us without havi to look for 
s? Do we have sufficient 
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1 capacity? 
DR GARWIN: In nion we sufficient types 2 
3 of warheads. We to manufacture more of a 
4 particular kind. We have plenty of material for doing that. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Are those adequately tested so 
6 that we know they're reliable and they will --
7 DR. GARWIN: Yes, the ones that I'm talking about 
8 are adequately tested and can be maintained reliable without 
9 nuclear testing. That was a lot of the discussion that went 
10 on before. 
11 Let me just say that when I talked about a proof 
12 test, I meant a real underground nuclear explosion. 
13 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Thank you. 
14 DR. GARWIN: Yes. 
15 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: So, what you're saying then is 
16 we have sufficient knowledge right now and we have sufficient 
17 technology to manufacture roughly a thousand some odd 
18 warheads that d be suffic to otect us and be a 
19 sufficient deterrent against an attack and would be 
20 survivable would protect our country? 
21 DR. GARWIN: That assumes that the Soviet Union is 
22 not impelled and not allowed to build vastly more warheads 
23 than we would have. I'm not advocating 1,000 on our side, 
24 20,000 on their side. 
25 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: But it's indicated that in fact 
26 we can verify t. In fact we could rea some 
27 agreement so that we could reduce our numbers down to 1,000, 
28 that we in fact have ili now of producing 




























would be reliabl 
So, seems information here 
that we've heard s morning, that it is possible for our 
country to embark upon a r istic test ban and, I think most 
ion in the amount of weapons 
e amount of warheads that we 
people here d agree, a r 
that we cur 
currently have available to us. 
DR. GARWIN: That's my view. Some people see the 
security of the United States only in an unending arms race 
with the Soviet Union, not I. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Would most people here agree 
that we could in fact ficiently defend our country and 
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e is some debate about 
still maintain a 
two super ers. 
s as low as 1,000. 
Some of 
I think 
number needs to be higher 
26 than 1,000. 
27 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: is the range? 
28 DR. WHITE: Let me just ck, for example, a number 
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is, reductions of 50 cent. At least would be 
regarded fairly uniformly as a significant first step towards 
reaching a more stable relationship. 
Let me also add that there is some question about 
whether or not the existing inventory of weapon types would 
be sufficient for the foreseeable future to maintain a stable 
relationship at those lower numbers of weapons. 
I think one of the lessons that we can learn from 
history is that developments outside of the area of nuclear 
technology may serve to imperil the viability of nuclear 
forces and that in the past at least -- and perhaps we can 
project from past experience -- judgments have been made that 
new types of nuclear weapons might be required. 
That does not mean that one might wish to increase 
the overall numbers of nuclear numbers, but rather trade 
types now in the inventory for types that might have to be 
developed to meet new circumstances. 
Those judgments have been made in the past. It is 
20 likely that history will demonstrate that in the future such 
21 judgments will also be made. 
22 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I'm wondering if the unthinkable 
23 were to occur and we were to have a strike by some adversary 
24 and they were trying to knock out our capability of 
25 responding, what would the planet be like in relationship to 
26 what we've heard about potential nuclear winter and is that a 
27 , feasible option for anyone to realistically consider that as 
28 an option; an all-out first strike attack on another country 
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1 capability of responding if with nothing more than our subs 
2 and other missiles that are capable of moving and are not 
easi i i e as to eir loca on, they'll e to 
4 respond. 
5 so, my question would it be just madness to ever 
6 contemplate it in the first place with the destruction of the 
7 country that you attack, but it also could rebound to have 
8 ects on your own country. 
9 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Assemblyman Bates, I'm reminded 
10 of a hearing that this Committee had in this same room 
11 several years ago when Beverlee Myers was the director of the 
12 1 Department of Health Service. We had the western regional 
13 representative from FEMA, a department of the Emergency 
14 1 Management Agency to testify. And we've been interested and 
15 this Committee has had a history of having hearings on just 
16 exactly what you're raising now. We were concerned about the 
17 nuclear winter, we were concerned about our participation in 
18 further research and testing of nuclear weapons. 
19 The representative from FEMA said in front of the 
20 Committee that if we had a six-day warning, that we could 
21 move the population of, say, Los Angeles from a high priority 
22 area to a low priority area. s suggestion was somewhere up 
around Edwards Air Force Base. Six days. 
24 As the testimony went on and on and on, several 
25 members of the Committee found that the ridiculous nature 
test made it unbearable to sit through it. So, we 
27 terminated the testimony. 
28 When Beverlee Myers came up, she said, I want to 
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1 reassure the members of this Committee that not a penny of 
2 state money will be spent to further that kind of strategy 
3 and planning for a nuclear holocaust. 
4 Now, her position then was that she saw that this 
5 probably could never be. We could never get the population 
6 of Los Angeles on the 410 away from Los Angeles up to Edwards 
7 Air Force Base, a few score miles away from Los Angeles, from 
8 the epicenter, to protect the several million people that 
9 would try to get out of town and certainly weren't going to 
10 be given a six-day warning. 
11 
12 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: See, my concern is a little bit 
broader. Like, for instance, when they had the nuclear 
13 accident in the Soviet Union, people in Europe were greatly 
14 concerned about being able to drink milk. They had pregnant 
15 women with children. They were directly concerned about what 
16 happened just from that little fallout. You can imagine what 




It would seem to me that particles would go into the 
20 atmosphere that would be damaging to the planet for 
21 centuries. Then if you were to counterattack, that would be 
22 the absolute icing on the cake. 
23 Now, if that theory is not true, then I would like 
24 to hear that that's not true. Because I hear some ideas from 
25 some people in this administration talking about winning a 
26 nuclear war or something, which seems to me to be absolute 
27 folly. You can't win a war like that. 
28 DR. BROWN: Can I address that? Because you raised 
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1 the issue of nuclear winter and that is something we have 
2 studied at Livermore Lab. 
3 I do not think you'll find any disagreement on this 
4 panel that the holocaust you've described is something that 
5 could be avoided. What we perhaps differ in is the approach 
6 to avoiding nuclear war. You can't win a nuclear war and I 
7 
1 
disagree with anybody who claims you can. 
8 As far as nuclear winter is concerned, our 
9 laboratory took it under its own initiative to take some of 
10 its resources and dedicate them at our own expense to study 
11 the nuclear winter problem. It's an extremely uncertain 
12 scenario that's been portrayed. I think there are a number 
13 of scientists who do agree that there's a lot of 
14 uncertainties involved. 
15 But there are many other reasons -- the threat of 
16 fallout, instant mass destruction and so on -- which are 
17 sufficient reason -- and Dr. Garwin pointed this out -- to 
18 avoid that situation in the first place. That's all I wanted 
19 to say. 
20 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Well, let me conclude. 
21 Unfortunately, I have to go now. I guess the panel will 
22 recess at a certain --
23 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Yes, recess. 
24 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I appreciate it. I've learned a 
25 i lot. I didn't realize the University was involved with 
26 lobbying for funds. I gather the way it's put, it's not 
27 basically lobbying. It's a request for their opinions before 
28 1 various policymakers and they proceed to give their opinions. 
I 
L 
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1 I understand that it's advantageous for the 
2 Department of Energy to have the kind of research that' 
3 done. It's high-quality. I just really think it's a shame 
4 that the great University of California is involved in 
5 putting its prestige on the line to build these kinds of 
6 weapons and be involved with providing the administration to 
7 see this kind of happen. 
8 I'd much rather it if the University would in fact 
9 devote more of its time in trying to figure out things like 
10 how we can avoid these conflicts, issues about using the 
11 weapons in another way, to decommission them and figure out a 
12 peaceful way of de-escalating this arms raise. 
13 So, I gather that the Regents may not agree with 
14 that view, but I think as a public member that it's important 
15 for us to try to get the University out of this madness and 
16 this race and try to devote itself more toward ways in which 
17 we can be competitive with the rest of the world in a time in 
18 which our efficiency and our competitive advantage in other 
19 areas is sorely lacking and our scientists would -- not in 
20 building the great numbers that they are into the arms race 
21 and would in fact be trained in a way to help our country be 
22 able to build things like stereos and things that we can 
23 compete with the Japanese and the West Germans and the French 
24 and other people in ways to make our economy strong rather 
25 than devoting all this energy into things that hopefully will 
26 never be used and have very little, I think, application to 
27 our strong economy that we need to build in this country. 
28 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Senator Campbell. 
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1 SENATOR CAMPBELL: Madam Chair, it seems to me that 
2 we released the nuclear genie some years ago. Although we 
aren't particularly proud of that fact, we did release it. 
4 Now, I guess it's the fact that our policy is mad. 
I think it's called mutually assured destruction. That, 
6 horrible as it sounds, is what's managed to keep peace for 
7 about 40 years or maybe a little more. Peace not necessarily 
8 as we want it, but as we know it today. 
9 I think the dilemma in which we find ourselves is 
10 that we'd like to say, no more. It's like the inventor of 
11 the long bow, who said this is the ultimate weapon and 
12 they'll never invent something better. But somebody's going 
13 to come up with something new. 
14 Unless we're capable of maintaining a degree of 
15 balance for the security of this country, then the potential 
16 for losing the freedoms and liberties that we have exists. I 
17 think that's the difference that reasonable people can have 
18 is how do you prevent the war. 
19 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Can I put you on hold? Because 
20 we'll continue with this and I do appreciate you staying 
1 through this period of time. 
22 May I invite all of the witnesses, including the 
23 scientists at the UC system, the administration of the uc 
4 system, the scientists that belong to the Southern California 
25 Federation of Scientists, members of the Committee and the 
pr s to a hosted buffet luncheon at McKenna's. McKenna's is 
27 in the Ellis Building at lOth and L. 
28 We will recess the Committee now and we will come 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
1 back at 2:00 and we'll go from 2:00 to 4:00. So, we'd like 
2 to have you in for a luncheon and we'd like to get you back 
3 and we are going to start right on time at 2:00. 
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1 establish such a committee? In other words, in terms of 
2 resolving the question rel lity. Are there adequate 
3 people within the confines of the University? Scientists who 
4 are either affiliated with the University or who would 
5 participate in something like this? 
6 DR. MARK: I would think of it as mechanically 
7 possible. I'm not sure that it is just a role that should be 
8 taken up by the University. It ought to be taken up by a 
9 congressional group like Markey's. If, say, you assemble a 
10 group, half of them might come from the University of 
11 California to go into this allegation that Ray Kidder has 
12 said was rather impr ly based. 






DR. DeWITT: Among the nine candidates of the 
University of ifor 
scientists wi 
and other cal 
worked at the weapons 1 
a, ere are a fair number of expert 
background in physics, chemistry 
ines and who have at various times 
atories as consultants or staff 
19 members who have had proper clearances and still get them. 




The osest thing we to it is the uc Academic 
23 and Scientific Advisory Committee, which I'll speak to a 
24 little next panel, ch has been asked to look into some of 
25 these technical questions. Now, I think they could make a 
26 good first pass at it if they have the will to do so. So far 
27 
28 
that has not happened. It may happen this year. 
In r , I do ink that it's a broader 
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own involvement in this issue. They, to use the familiar 
phrase, in my direct r ence wi them e simply swept 
this issue under the rug have acted as though it didn't 
' exist and have stayed completely silent about the whole 
issue. 
So, I don't believe it's a question of getting the 
University heavily involved in matters which the Department 
of Energy actually responsible for at all. It's to get 
i the University of California on record as at least 
understanding that there is a big technical dispute going on 
between people like me and people like some of the other 
people at the labs and people like Garwin and Carson Mark 
i here and so on and understand that this is an important issue 
and then make whatever recommendation the University thinks 
ght be appr iate, i might be nothing more than 
writing a let r to some appropriate member of Congress and 
saying, hey, e Un ersi 
has looked into is and we 
We recommend s. 
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speak to that comes 
ornia Advisory Committee 
ink someth ought to be done. 
ce President Frazer will 
with the next panel. 
So, it is e for the University to do 
something like this or it is sible that the University 
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woul rticipate in 
em? 've got e labs 
Un si to take the 
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13 
1 next step. 
2 Can I ask a stion in morning I 
3 addressed question ver iable. I was asking -- and 
4 one member spoke to that. I would like to hear from the labs 
5 about whether their view is that in fact we can have a 
6 verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
7 DR. BROWN: Earlier in this session I submitted a 
8 statement that was prepared by Dr. Jim Hannon of Livermore 




ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: What is the answer? 
DR. BROWN: The answer is long. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Just yes or no. Just start with 
13 yes or no. 
14 DR. BROWN: No. The answer is today --
15 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: You don't believe it can be 
16 done. 
17 DR. BROWN: I don't think it can be verified 
18 adequately to that --
19 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: At what level --
20 DR. BROWN: We're talking about levels of a few 
21 kilotons. 
22 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I don't know what that means. 
23 DR. BROWN: Of explosive yield. 
24 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: What does a few kilotons mean? 
25 DR. BROWN: What was the yield of the Hiroshima 
26 bomb? Thirteen kilotons. The order of the problems of a 
27 Comprehensive Test Ban are -- there's two aspects of the 
28 problem, detecting that an event has taken place and then 
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judgment that is based on weighing the dangers of cheating 
below the thr d 
not having an agreement. I 
comparison to make. 
li versus the dangers of 
that is the correct 
In my view the dangers of testing below the 
140 
threshold of detectability, the number of tests that could be 
accomplished without a very serious chance of being detected, 
compared to the number that would be required to obtain some 
significant military event leaves me concluding that 
although, of course, it's not perfectly verifiable, it would 
be adequately verifiable. 
But, again, you need to understand that reasonable 
1 people looking at same technical data about verification 
can reach different judgments about what is adequate. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: What about on site? 
DR. HOLDREN: On te contributes to your ability to 
verify. There's no stion my mind that the Soviets have 
become in the last sever years much more forthcoming about 
the possibilities of on-site verification. 
If we take 
they are ncere 
up on that and it turns out that 
accommodating with respect to on-site 
inspection, this will make the task of verification far 
, easier. 
It still could not be perfect. That is, even with 
the kinds of on-site agreements that you could imagine, there 
would be some probability that some kinds of tests under 
certain circumstances ght escape detection. But the 
judgment of us who it's adequately verifiable is 
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION (916) 362-2345 
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d Test Ban Treaty at 150 kilotons. 
Hiroshima bomb. 
e that people could agree that 
the level of the Hiroshima 
bomb -- say 10 or 15 kilotons -- could be verified with very 
high assurance 
In my opinion would not be enough. I believe 
that if we agree on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the 
Soviet Union, the rest of the world would rightly regard that 
as the major weapons powers fiddling with the rules in a way 
that continues to rna it easier for them to play the game 
12 while others cannot. We co d do a lot with testing below 
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Livermore seismic 
I a great re for the 
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moderate nuclear were e oice of the 
treaty. 
Seismol ists outs the 1 atory -- and we heard 
from Dr. Jack Ever i mor ng in great detail --
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Dr Harold tz 
with Dr. Frazer, 
I'm i if 
that I've had t's 
as they see it of the Un 
Pa ne Then we'll pick up 
Dr Mark Dr. DeWitt. 
is will address a concern 
running all day. That is the role 
rsi and social 
7 responsibility and environmental conditions as a result of 
8 nuclear testing that's in accordance with policy. 
9 Dr. Josephine St n, with the American Association 
10 for the Advancement of Science. 
11 Dr. Stein. 
12 DR. STEIN: ve much, Senator Watson. 
13 I'm Josephine Anne St n I'm a Ph.D. in mechanical 
14 engineering from MIT. I'm presently in washington as the 
15 Science and Arms Contr Nati Securi Fellow of the 
16 American at ion of Science working in 
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5 explosives are not militari useful as battl ield weapons. 
6 Nuclear weapons are instruments of deterrence and deterrence 
7 only. Deterrence rests upon the possibility of nuclear 
8 retaliation, something that military planners must take with 
9 the utmost seriousness irregardless of the status of nuclear 
10 testing or the details of warhead design. 
11 The laboratory scientists have used a parade of 
12 arguments against the ~v·m~•Lehensive Test Ban that range from 
13 misleading to preposterous to downright fallacious. In the 
14 mid-SO's Dr. Edward Teller argued that the Soviets could 
15 cheat on a 
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d muffle osions underground 
to e influence of such 
25 arguments, Dr. George K who was the science 
26 advisor to President Ei r, said: 
27 "I am now convi that a 
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In 1957 President senhower said at a press 
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use this on tt 
be no fallout. 
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omi him a clean hydrogen bomb 
e in four to five years. "If you 
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nuclear 
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earthquake epicenter ready to go 
Even so, the seismic signatures of 
r osion are distinctive. 
some risk of detection. 
sted the Soviets can 
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osion. 
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om ent sts 1 s to two 
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tacle to a CTB; two, that the 
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work on a new third generation nuclear weapons. But 
they 1 re not ju 










ession for techniques 
ense would be put up 
e working on a cycle of 
offensive/defens e measures countermeasures that 
guarantee an 
1 participation of 
ss arms race wi 
e Soviets. 
or wi the 
The situation we are f w th arises from the 
contradictory ass s of the weapons laboratories. On 
the one hand, as nati 
Alamos are to r 
the national interest. On 
1 atories, Livermore and Los 
to national security needs and 
other hand, the laboratories 
were charter 
responsibili of 
which necessa ly 
continue to be charged with the 









use r considerable influence 
weapons 1 
in nuclear 
to lobby nst ituation is analogous to 
having parents g 1 r an allowance to t them how 
to handle once re f nanci independent and 
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ter of pol i 
s Lawrence 





























ivermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories. At the same 
time the State of ifornia d assist the laboratories 
in a transition to other scientific work -- advanced research 
in astrophysics, meteor ogy, exploration, material 
research, energy research, biomedical engineering. The list 
goes on. 
Once the mission of the laboratories is redefined, 
then the primary source of opposition to a Comprehensive Test 
Ban goes away, national policy to have such a Comprehensive 
Test Ban can be implemented, between one and two billion 
dollars that is annually on nuclear R&D can be 
reallocated by the federal government to other programs that 
the laboratories would be eligible to compete for. The 
laboratories would then be brought into conformance with 
what's appropriate r a great university -- open inquiry and 
dissemination of Thank you ve much. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you much, Dr. Stein. 
Dr. Schwartz, es tz, Un rsity of 
California, Berk 
DR. SCHWARTZ: 
Charles tz I'm a Pr 
ve much. My name is 
Physics at the 
Un sity ifornia, Berk 
I have been for ite a number of years an active 
and persistent critic the L rmore Los Alamqs 
Laboratories and parti ar of University's role in the 
relations of 1 In a word and a half I can 
summarize my objection i that the University performs 
a sservice to nat on t with those 
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associates in Wa 
to 1 ratory managers and their close 
ngton, whose mission is the continuation 
5 of the arms race, the appearance of broad-minded, diverse 
6 baJance and objective id technical opinions on these 
7 questions to help guide e nations. 
8 This is a deception that is granted simply by the 
9 existence of the name University of California and by the 
10 absence of any real balanced oversight, d rsity, input into 
11 the labs' work and eir communications, which are frequent 
12 and intense, with the cisionmakers in Washington. 
13 This morning Dr. Jack Evernden said that UC has 













e question is 
e 1 atory. 
are the 
I'd like to 
show you a bit of 
very revealing 
ion on is i I think will be 
In 1 9 
around the Board of 
ere was intense on these subjects 
s, both on the Board and from 
protest act iti outs 
things. There were proposals 
I was in all of those 
ore the Board of Regents for 
23 the establishment of a new, independent and diverse oversight 
24 body that could elp ieve the k of balanced approach 
25 and assessment of weapons ems we heard talked 
26 about today. 
27 But there was also a countermove from Washington. 
28 The Secreta of Ene i a s ial commission to 
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1 study this problem. The commission was made up of old 
2 weapons labs directors, from ense and un rsity 
3 officials, people were te f iar members of the 
4 status quo who were not really interested in any change. 
5 Their major recommendation was that the University's 
6 involvement with the lab should continue and that, quote, 
7 "The major need of the laboratories is an effective group to 
8 discharge the trusteeship functions." What was meant by this 
9 was spelled out in a statement to the Board of Regents in May 
10 1974; statment made by Duane Sewell, Assistant Secretary for 
11 Defense Programs for the Department of Energy. Let me read 
12 his quote carefully for 
13 "As I see it, this means that the 
14 trusteeship group •• " that means 
















more meetings at 
and els re 
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will have to hold 
laboratories 
been the 
case in immediate st, and 
certai more homework will have 
to be members of this 
group to come familiar with the 
laboratories 1 programs and 
administrat problems. I am sure 
that this group wi also be called 
upon to make more public statements 
supporting laboratories and 











By the way, Duane 
of the Department 
r the second-i 
r programs." 
very ea y the mission of 
e rtment of Energy. 
1, ivered this advice on behalf 
· Ener , was only a few months earlier 
fici at the Livermore Lab, where 
7 his whole histo career 






of people from the 1 working up. By the way, the labs are 
a completely own organization. People come there for 
technical reasons. If 
promoted. All 
people who have r 
rform 1, they may be 
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ole careers there. Many of them 
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Then the committee, this SAAC, that they set up was 
just a revamping of a previous 
been clear to mai n status 
and its mission has 
people on that 
cornittee are overwhelmingly members of the old club who know 
how the labs work, are sympathetic to that and want to 
maintain it. 
I should point out that while the discussions here 
have been almost exclusively around the politics by the labs 
around the CTB issues, there are a number of other examples. 
In repeated presentations before the Board of Regents I and 
others have brought these up in documents and testimony to 
the Board just a year ago September. I listed some of these 
in detail. The first significant one that I had 
discovered -- and by the way, all of my information comes 
from public sources. I am not an insider with access to the 
secret works of the labs. So, I know what happens to leak 
out in public -- was admissions by Los Alamos Director Agnew 
concerning the history of the neutron bomb in which he said 
that there was some difficul in the early 70's there 
getting this new idea for a new kind of weapon accepted in 








hearings, he said: 
"We at Los Alamos have a small, but 
very elite group meets with 




in the various think 
are working very 
, t to influence 
















e Department of Defense to 
consi usi weapons 
so for 
es these are more recent. And I 
an increase both the overt --well, 
overt is all I can see. I can't tell you about the covert 
political actions the lab. I ink the position taken by 
the Regents has endorsed and encouraged more such. During 
the nuclear freeze campaign the laboratory was very active in 
training and encouraging its employees to get out there and 
engage in ic te Of course, we have also, I think, 
very clear d role of the laboratory officials 
in pushing SDI pr ram. 
14 So, this is a structural situation which should not 
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If you were to take a sample -- and there's one that 
can document this some 's available -- about the 
e at the labs about 
nuclear weapons policies, d a certain diversity, 
a certain spread. If you were to do a similiar measurement, 
say, among the faculty rs at Un si ty of 
California who are knowledg e about this, you would get 
another spread. But the University spread would be out here 
(indicating) and the lab spread would be about here 
(indicating). Nothing at all congruent between these two 
distributions. 
Dr. DeWitt over here is an absolutely unique 
phenomenon at the laboratory by being a active dissident. He 
is one. Dr. Kidder, I would say, is half a dissident. One 
and a half dissidents out a staff several thousand is 
not a very good tr record for Un ersity of California 
to proclaim as its success rate in promoting diversity, 
freedom of ession. I think it is a measure of incredible 
failure. It is a failure consciou achieved through 
decisions by the Board Regents in the presence of the 
arguments e and have been 
presented to the st. 
I, therefore, it is false to imagine that 
improvements are lik made from within by the Regents 
or by slightly improved ormance by the Scientific 
Advi Committee was mentioned by a previous speaker. 
I e is a f essential 
opportunity need for rs the Legislature to 























find steps that they can take. A concept has 
about of a 
e i 
would 
truly representi d 
levels of assessment on 
incr i tance. 
I i it is a r 
i t be 






of the Legislature to 
do this, because 
people of this state. 
University of Cal ornia belongs to the 
I ink the Regents have failed -- one 
mi even 
out to the 
I call upon 
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some balance, recti 
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, Senator Watson members of 
ow at Center of 
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gy defense activities. 
I come is 
r e of ear 
over the nuclear test 
tuni to esent my views on 
laboratories in the policy debate 
and to review the question whether 
5 the University of California has wisely exercised its 
6 management responsibilities in this sensitive area. 
7 Scientists who venture into the public policy arena 
8 have a special responsibility. They must assure that the 
9 instinctive deference that is accorded their unique base of 
10 nuclear knowledge does not become a license to undercut or 
11 manipulate the normal decisionmaking processes of our 
12 democratic institutions. This caution especially applies to 
13 the officials UC's nuclear weapons laboratories, whose 
14 purported base of expertise is not only highly specialized, 
15 but largely secret. 
16 How 1 UC in assuring that its 
17 laboratory oyees e to this essential criterion for 
18 scientists in the public arena? On sis of a thorough 
19 acquaintance with the record of the test ban debate since 
20 1957 and with firsthand experience of these matters on 
21 Capitol Hill nee 1979, I must tell you that, with certain 
22 
23 
notable exceptions, the record 1 atory officials in 
this respect has been orable; especially in recent years. 
24 In general, laboratory officials have not confined 
25 themselves to their statuto r e as ans of the 
26 classified know! rtise which supports deployment 
27 of a nuclear deterrent the United States. Instead they 
28 have arr to lves defi ng which 





















nuclear forces and arms control approaches are appropriate 
goals for U.S. policy. In ew have en abused 
their secret base of knowledge by constructing a kind of 
technical fait d'accompli to steer public policy toward their 
preferred objective of an endless technical competition in 
nuclear arms. 
The unwary politician or policymaker and I've 
known a lot of them -- faced with the spectre of decaying 
warheads and a threatened mass exodus from the laboratories 
1 may understandably fail to recognize that the entire 
structure of the lab argument against a test ban is based on 
prior and current design and maintenance practices for the 
nuclear stockpile. These practices can and would be changed 
under a test ban regime. 
Moreover, most of actices were developed to 
provide the very m ita acteristics of a nuclear war 
fighting capability are at the center of the policy 
te over the test 
well-reasoned techni 
Thus labs' apparently 
against the test ban is 
20 embarrasingly circular. It's somewhat akin to arguing that a 
21 ban on the heroin trade should be done on the grounds that 
22 the poppy farmers will go krupt. It doesn't make sense. 
23 It should be readily apparent from the preceding 
24 testimony heard today the real public policy choice is 
25 not between a r iable deterrent and an unreliable one or 
26 1 between unrestrained future testing and inevitable nuclear 
27 amnesia or between a robust nuclear force or none at all. 
28 The actual range of poli ions is much broader than this 































and I believe the proper role of the nuclear weapons 
laboratories is to eluc 
requirements 
not their role to 
to defend their choice 
largely classified data 
, to ri technical 
se icy options. It is 
ively between them and then 
on their interpretation of a 
which they control. 
If the system were working properly, the lab 
directors would not take it upon themselves to declare u.s. 
treaty commitments obsolete. And I am submitting for the 
record a rather extensive compilation of what the laboratory 
directors have said in Wa 
concerning nuclear testi 
ngton over last five years 
issues. They have unilaterally 
taken it upon themselves to declare before congressional 
committees that U.S. tr 
testing should 
dispensed wi d 
United States wa 
Test Ban. I r 
Inst 1 
i 
commitments regarding nuclear 
ete, 
is even as 
to ot 
d forgotten and 
President of the 
a Comprehensive 
e. 
atory directors would present 
disinterested, car ul ses for legislators and 
policymakers of what i ormation will be generated; as well 
as what information would ied test practices geared 
i options, ranging from zero yield to the full range 
and zero tests to status quo at 1 kilotons. 
If 1 a to fi als are as deeply concerned as 
they claim to 
diplomatic goals wi 
as they perce 




inconsistency of u.s. 
r irements of deterrence 
course these analyses 
CORPORAT 6) 2-2345 
1 they should point out these inconsistencies and suggest 
2 modifications ther to the military requirements or to the 
3 proposed test restrictions to accommodate these 
4 inconsistencies. 
5 As matters now stand, the chief contribution of the 
6 present laboratory leadership to the public policy debate 
7 over nuclear testing has been to obscure the real nature of 
8 the choices available and to obstruct the formation of a 
9 ' political consensus supporting a very low-yield threshold 
10 ban. 
11 This role, of course, is just the opposite of what 
12 the American people are entitled to expect from the leaders 
13 ' of the national laboratories. Their technical expertise 
14 should be used to clarify public policy choices regarding 
15 science, energy and national security and used to facilitate 
16 the process of decisionmaking by those legally entrusted with 
17 the responsibility for national security policy. 
18 National laboratory representatives should not make 
19 pronouncements in their official capacity on matters which 
20 are clearly beyond their sphere of competence and 
21 responsibility such as the, quote, "requirements of 
22 deterrence"; the psychology and motivation of Soviet leaders; 
23 the alleged obsolescence of u.s. treaty commitments; the 
24 proclivity of Soviet scientists to cheat; the political will 
25 of future Congresses to provide adequate funds in a test ban 
26 I environment; the overall goals of u.s. national security 
27 strategy; and the, quote, "verifiability of a comprehensive 
28 ban". In my view these are all subjects which are beyond the 
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1 competence and responsibility of the directors of the nuclear 
2 weapons laboratories. 
3 A moratorium on pronouncements regarding CTB 
4 verification would be especially welcomed. Neither the 
5 laboratories nor anyone else has advanced an agreed 
6 definition of what a comprehensive ban would be in practice 
7 and to my knowledge a comprehensive verification analysis 
8 incorporating all intelligence assets of the United States 
9 government and its allies has never been conducted. We 
10 simply do not know what the relevant overall probabilities of 
11 detection are for such a, quote, "comprehensive agreement". 
12 Unfortunately, this ignorance has never deterred 
13 laboratory spokesmen from advertising the infeasibility of a 
14 comprehensive agreement. The word "comprehensive", by the 
15 way, means in all environments. It is not foreordained that 
16 a CTB must cover all explosive releases of nuclear energy, 
17 which can be quite small. 
18 A test ban which reduced the yield of allowable 
19 nuclear explosions to some modest multiple of the largest 
20 military chemical explosives would, in my view, fulfill the 
21 intent of the CTB as a prohibition on the further development 
22 of weapons of mass destruction. 
23 Proper management would also assure that laboratory 
24 personnel do not selectively invoke the classified record of 
25 past nuclear design and test practices as prima facie 
26 evidence that such ices are necessarily required in the 
27 future to correct deficiencies in the nuclear stockpile. 
28 On the other hand, national laboratory 
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1 representatives should analyze the full range of propo 
2 test restrictions for r pr anned 
3 military requirements for nuclear ile. They should 
4 analyze for each proposed testing regime which military 
5 requirements could and could not be met within the 
6 constraints of that regime. They should explore and document 
7 optimum alternative test, design and maintenance practices 
8 for each proposed test ban regime that would maximize 
9 stockpile confidence and shelf life within the limits imposed 
10 by that regime. They should analyze the results of their 
11 prior analyses for ir sensit to various effective 








Unfortunate , D.C.'s management of the nuclear 
weapons laboratories has 1 
situation. 










to a rather uncomfortable 
directors are starting the facts 
the present stockpile to be 
their predecessors have 
practices ich rect 
rcut 1 S. di omatic tments. 
20 In ei case, a Presi Carter scovered when 
21 he tried t iate a test res t is intolerable 
22 from of f i 
23 A tom, outside 
24 review of 1 at r es nuclear s , test and 
25 stockpile surve lance programs d be instituted 
26 immediately wi the a of restoring competence and 
27 willingness of laboratory leadership to provide objective, 
28 accurate ses of e uation and mai 































techniques under the full range of policy alternatives. Not 
just th r preferr 
alternatives; i 
ternat es 
a test i 
1 range of 
ecluded all 
explosions that could not be contained in a reusable 
above-ground facility and observed by personnel within 30 
meters and includi test bans wi thresholds of, say, 300 
tons, 1 kiloton, 3 to 5 kilotons and 10 to 15 kilotons. 
If we had such analyses, it would be much easier for 
politicians and the Executive Branch to formulate and agree 
to a consensus on nuclear test ban policies. 
Second, gui ines should be developed similar to 
those governing the interaction of the intelligence community 
with the policymaking branches of government. These would 
necessarily be informal idelines as long as the 
laboratories st under is of Un sity of 
California. No one ire to restrict individual's 
freedom However se gui ines should 
emphasize the fference sis is within the 
laboratories' e of and questions of overall 
national ination are ly within the 
sphere of Branch ress. The 
legitimate purpose the national laboratories is to serve 
these democratic instit 
outwit them. 
ons; not to sidestep, circumvent or 
A system of management incentives should be 
instituted wher l are no longer 
rewarded for their talents at sleading Congress, 
undercutting Presi and protecting those ements of 
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1 our society with ideological and career investments in 
2 nuclear arms race. 
3 The national laboratories are in theory national 
4 r assets. The taxes of all Americans go to support them. The 
5 work they do should serve to illuminate the full range of 
6 nuclear weapons policy options facing the American people; 
7 not just the options favored by those with vested interests 
8 in the design, development and production of improved nuclear 
9 weaponry. 
10 I believe that an unimpeded channel, independent of 
11 the Division of Military Application and its associated units 
12 within the laboratories, must be created for the analysis and 
13 transmission of objective nuclear stockpile information to 
14 decisionmakers within the Executive Branch and to the 
15 legislative branches government. 
16 If uc management oves incapable or unwilling to 










scientific credibility to the laboratories' presentation of 
, test ban issues, then it should divest itself of the 
management contract and remove the figleaf of intellectual 
' respectability which it currently extends over the 
laboratories' activities. Thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you so much, Mr. Paine. 
Dr. William R. Frazer. 
DR. FRAZER: Let me very briefly describe to you the 
means by which the Universi of California carries out its 
27 contractual responsibilities. I'll describe not only the 
28 management structure, but also the means we have of carrying 





























out the oversight function. 
s are r in such matters as 
the appointment hi evel personnel, selection of 
directors, top-level salary administration, et cetera. 
There is a Regental Committee on Oversight of the 
Department of Energy laboratories that currently consists of 
12 Regents. The Committee visits each laboratory once a 
year. The President and I participate in these visits. The 
Committee's function is to become highly informed on major 
issues affecting the laboratories and to lend its 
considerable expertise when appropriate and to act as a 
source of information to the full board. 
The University is assisted in discharging its 
oversight responsibility by the use of expert, independent 
and broadly constituted advisory committees appointed by and 
reporting to the President. Two standing committees are 
currently in operation. Let me describe them to you briefly. 
You've heard one them ready, Scientific and 
Academic Advisory ttee. 
This committee, established in 1971, has oversight 
responsibility to Los amos and the Livermore 
Laboratory. Its role is to ovi expert evaluation and 
render advice on any and 1 topics that affect the quality 
of the laboratories' formance. I've attached the charge 
of the committee and a list of its members in my formal 
testimony. I i '11 see it sa very distinguished 
group of Committee s. 
meets four times a , twice at each 
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l laboratory. Typically, the meetings focus on a specific 
2 component of the laboratories' program examine it 
3 in-depth. Again, moving a little rapidly here. The agenda 
4 for this committee is prepared by myself in consultation --
5 by the committee chairman in consultation with me and with 
6 the advice of the laboratory directors. 
7 That committee, as you've just heard earlier today 
8 from Dr. Kidder, is now in the process of responding to my 
9 request made several months ago that they examine the issue 
10 that is of such interest to this Committee, the use of 
11 nuclear tests by the laboratories in their nuclear weapons 
12 program and the relationship of these tests to a 
13 Comprehensive Test Ban. That committee's independence, broad 
14 expertise and access to classified information are essential 
15 qualities for this important task. 
16 There's a second committee that I'll just refer to 
17 briefly, the Heal , Safety and Environment Advisory 
18 Committee. I think name of that is probably 
19 ! self-explanatory I won't more about it. 
20 
21 
Let me just make 
based on listening to all 
a concluding remark or two 
testimony you've heard today. 
22 I think you're well aware, having heard the 
23 testimony now, of the complexity of the issues you're dealing 
24 with here. I think you're well aware of the spectrum of 
25 opinion and not just between the University representatives 
26 and the others, but the very wide spectrum of opinions and 
27 blendings and subtleties from one to another of the witnesses 
28 you've heard; a very disti uished group of witnesses, 
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1 laboratories. Over the years the University's oversight role 
2 has become more and more active, more and more thorough. It 
3 has evolved considerably in the past few years. As I said, 
4 just this year, just a few months ago, I've commissioned the 
5 SAAC Committee to examine many of the questions you're 
6 looking at today. 
7 Could that oversight role be improved? Could we do 
8 better? Of course we could. It's like asking could our 
9 oversight role of the campuses be improved. Of course we 
10 could improve. We're not perfect and I have every intention 
11 of assuring you that we take this oversight role very 
12 seriously and will attempt to exercise it and do attempt to 
13 exercise it to the best of our ability. Thank you. 




DR. HOLDREN: Yes, I'm still John Holdren. I will 
17 now tackle the second issue on the agenda, which is the 
18 University's role in the management of the laboratories. 
19 It seems to me that one needs to ask two questions. 
20 One is whether that management relationship has been in the 
21 University's interest; and the second question is whether it 
22 has been in the public's interest. 
23 As far as the University's interests are concerned, 
24 of course one addresses the University's main missions; which 
25 are teaching, research and service. One thinks first of the 
26 two missions, teaching and research, which are in some sense 
27 unique in their combination to the University itself, the 
28 question of the Universi 's role in the creation and 
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and former lab staff 
kinds of interactions 
f as a 
i 
sity professor 
from some of the 
occur, I have to say that the 
5 benefits in this connection are modest. They are not 
6 insignificant, but they are also not enormous and most of 
7 them could be maintained no matter who is managing the lab. 
8 That is, the constructive relationships between the 
9 University of California campuses and the laboratories are 
10 mainly based on some areas of mutual interest, access to 
11 resources of mutual benefit and proximity. Those kinds of 
12 relationships exist in many other instances where the 
13 University itself does not manage the organization in 
14 question. 
15 As far as servi 
16 down to key ar 
17 That is, as 
ude 
by its r e i 
the operation of those 1 
management it f 
Now, n, as 
the University side 
of the Un si 's 
in the public interest. I 
and white one way or the 
is concerned, this really comes 
issue of ic interest. 
st here, we can only 
is f a ic service 
1 atories we find that 
atories under University 
interest. 
wi rience both from 
lab side, I do see some aspects 
role 
't thi 
i I ieve have been 
issue is all black 












University management name at least has helped to maintain 
a high ess in 1 at staffs, 
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1 although I have to say I do not think that the Universi s 
2 the only organization in our society capable of helping the 
3 labs maintain the needed level of technical competence. 
4 I think it is true that the University's management 
5 has helped insulate the laboratories from micromanagement by 
6 the Department of Energy; although, again, I would not 
7 concede that the University is the only manager capable of 
8 accomplishing that goal. 
9 I think it is true that the University's management 
10 i has helped create at least a degree of toleration of dissent 
11 in the laboratories, which has been a desirable thing; 
12 although there aren't enough Hugh DeWitts, there aren't 
13 enough Ray Kidders. Nevertheless, it is important that the 
14 degree of tolerance which has permitted them to exist there 
15 and to object to official positions has been a desirable 
16 thing. 
17 But I do not think these advantages, although they 
18 are significant, are sufficiently weighty to overwhelm the 
19 very strong argument against the effectiveness of the 
20 University's role. That argument, as has already been 
21 mentioned here, is that the University in its role as a more 
22 or less absentee manager of the laboratory creates an 
23 impression of a degree of critical scrutiny, a degree of 
24 oversight, a degree of guidance, a degree of academic 
25 respectability in some sense; an impression which is really 
26 not justified by the nature of the relationship. 
27 It is true there is and has been an oversight 
28 committee. It is true there are visits. But I think if one 




































were to be happy with 
University serves as 
Again, I come 
earlier remarks. We 
the 1 atories 















atories and the 
est 
nature of 
e in principle to 
to be e to exercise 
of steeri , the 
scrutiny that I think 
ic conscious d require if we 
s arrangement which the 
ian is contract. 
nt t I made in my 
to possibility that 
for a 1 time in what 
the economist Kenneth 
i best ways to do 
i to ise new 
to be more 
r to 
making us less 











-~--~--~---- ---------------~- 1-~ 
1 of its role in sustaining this illusion that this is what our I 
2 national securi ires its custodial relationship. 1 
3 I do think we need in this country a nuclear 
4 weapons establishment. I think we need it for unfortunate 
5 reasons. We would need it even if we achieved a 
6 Comprehensive Test Ban as an insurance policy. 
7 So, I am not arguing that the United States can at 
8 the present state of the world do completely without a 
9 nuclear weapons design establishmenti but I do not believe 
10 that we need two nuclear weapons laboratories competing with 
11 each other. I think one would suffice. I don't think we 
12 need the prestige of the University of California put at the 
13 surface of the nuclear weapons establishment and put at its 
14 surface in particular in arguing politically that the 






maintain the national securi of the ted States. 
I nk is e we wrong. That is where 
the State a a r interest in this matter. 
That is, whether estige and the expertise of the 
University of California is instance is being put to 
21 good use. My conclusion on balance is that it has not been. 
22 Again, I emphasize from the standpoint of someone 
23 who's worked at the lab, I see very attractive aspects of the 
24 University management. It makes the lab a better, more 
25 attractive place to work. From the standpoint of permitting 
26 some tolerance of dissent, the management has been a good 
27 thing. But those advantages, in my view, cannot compensate 
28 for the fundamental oblem the Universi is lending 































respectablity, its prestige and an impression of 
oversight to an operation 
fact justified. Thank you. 
e none se things are in 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you, Dr. Holdren. 
Dr. Carson Mark. 
DR. MARK: Madam Chairwoman, I don't think I will 
take very long nor introduce anything particularly new. 
I said before and other people have said that the 
labs are in their operation observing what they are told to 
be national policy priorities. They have in that connection 
made statements about the negative effects of a Comprehensive 
Test Ban which have either been on false bases or poorly 
explained bases and for that I think criticism is most 
certainly due. 
The other thing which applies here and which I am 
sure you realize, although I haven't had it in my own sight 
for very long, is the inclination they have to proceed as 
they do is the assumption -- the absolutely basic ingrained 
assumption -- that the United States and the USSR are 
necessarily engaged indefinitely in a competitive all-out 
arms race. If you make that assumption, then the things 
which they have been doing can more easily be understood. 
There is no allowance when they talk about the 
terrible effects on their laboratory of a test ban; no 
allowance for the fact that if you had a test ban, some of 
these political climate features and some of that assumption 
would radically change and what the labs might be doing in 
the country's interest wo become a different set of 











we can new f we a test 
ban. Quite correct. you test don't need 
1 to make new weapons. So, things will be very different. 
The other last thing I would leave with some of your 
colleagues is one s feeling that this is a matter of 
desperate importance and has to be settled during this 
Congress, if not before, and things of that kind. I would 
just like to mention that of the 25 or 30,000 weapons in the 
10 u.s., more than 50 percent are more than 20 years old. so, 
11 the deterioration whi we hear so much about and the sudden 
12 collapse of 1 our securi isn't really so strongly 
13 underlined by fact. I will leave it there. 















nal , Dr. tt. 
DR. DeWITT: in, I am Hugh DeWitt, 30-year staff 
member of L 
if me as a 
r make a, 
e 
i 
e here have 
er oy. So, 
ully, very short 
Un sity of 
I will continue 
discussion 
California of w atories and, specifically, the 
oversight ies that been se up, institutional 
arrangements from ea ier ttees. 
I first want to mention in 1 8, after nearly a 
year of very stormy hearings ore a high-lev committee 
chaired by Vice lor liam Ger ding -- a committee 
appointed by, I eve, the UC esi at that time -- to 
examine the r ations 1 atories and 








Universi of ifornia. 
is rding 
Report, was st 1 ri for the 
University to run 1 atories so long as 
that management was moral intellectually responsible. 
Then it went on to discuss various ki new oversight 
7 arrangements. 
8 I have to agree Professor Schwartz that the 
9 main kind of oversight arrangement was simply more frequent 
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1 office. 
2 But al not ical 
3 people, th can't i sc entific 
4 arguments lab rs to justify important 







Now, s well is requires some 
scientists and r ires close attention by a group of 
qualified scientists. In inciple, this kind of effort 
could be done by another group that's been discussed by many 
of earlier ers, UC Scientific and Academic 
12 Advisory Committee for Livermore and Los Alamos. This group 
13 was created by the Zinner Report of 1971, another one of 
14 these big review committees way, way back. 
15 The Scientific isory Committee is the only entity 
16 in the UC stem that s sibili of exercising an 
17 i assessment i s of nuclear 
18 design work part ar i of the two 
19 ' laboratories. i 
20 Now, over s i i committee has 
21 included some ve it really has not 
22 exe cised k of critique of the 
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1 a very important statement asking the Committee to look into 
2 
3 
the techn ions about nuclear weapons reliability, 
which was ignored. I was e and can testi he was 
4 ignored. 
5 In 1982 the whole thing was brought up again rather 
6 carefully and with a lot of correspondence to the UC 
7 President, David Saxon, we were told that this kind of 
8 question, nuclear weapons design policy, was simply too hot 
9 to handle. It was a technical question, yes; but the UC 
10 Advisory Committee simply was not going to deal with it and 
11 the matter was dropped that year. 
12 Now, I'm very encouraged that apparently it's being 
13 , brought up again this year rather seriously and I think 















expect that e will an st crit coming out of 
the Adviso later this year. 
But int is 
i ttee 
issues, pr ri sc 
Some of this research, 
appropriate 
to do it, some 
I approve 
it 
But by and 1 
Advisory Committee 
status quo onto 
real oversi 
unt now function of 
to 1 at peripheral 
ic research at laboratories. 
the way, is very good and very 
it I support it. I even try 
the record of the Scientific 
basically to put a stamp of 
atories and not exercise any kind of 
function. 
So, I to conclude that the UC management of the 
weapons labor sense the Gerberding Report has 
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1 failed to be morally and intellectually responsible in the 
sense asked for. It's ssible task is really not 2 
3 possible. But I Un ersity could do a lot better. 
4 As I've said ore, I believe it's imperative that 
5 there be some body, some group of independent scientists with 
6 access to all classified information so there's no classified 
7 information barriers, no secrecy barriers to look into 
8 weapons design policy, examine the arguments given by lab 
9 spokesmen as to why nuclear testing should continue 
10 indefinitely; which is, of course, the position that the 
11 laboratories maintain. These arguments should be assessed 
12 and brought to the attention the u.s. Congress. 
13 If the Scientific Advisory Committee really can't do 
14 it, then I hope that Congress can find some other group that 
15 can. But at least at the present time the Scientific 
16 Advisory ttee a I ieve is trying hard 






1 arguments we've 
Now, a 
as a fulltime ss 
say that in recent 
still empl es 
scussi 
ick final 
here all today. 
nt. As I've been claimed 
or one complete dissident, I want to 
s e Livermore Laboratory, where I'm 
in standing, has a good 
23 record in allowing internal criticism and dissent such as 
24 I've been expressing. I've done a great of writing and 
25 publishing articles in respectable magazines and major 
26 newspapers, given testimony to ess and working with the 
27 press and I do my st to g my opinions also directly to 
28 lab management so I'm doi so there's no 















doing or to 
no attempt to suppress what I'm 
rea ten 
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opi ons are strongly different from Obvi 
those expressed most lab hierarchy and there are 
very few of us who express se dissident opinions. But I 
believe that it's appropriate there be some people in the 
laboratory who do s. freedom to express dissenting 
opinions by lab staff members in fact is quite good. So, I 
give the lab good marks at least in the present decade for 
this situation. Now, this is one good consequence of the UC 
management of the Livermore Laboratory. 
On balance at 
publically I 
present time I do have to 
continued UC management of the 
















But, as I earlier, I 
very weak, very tenuous 
failed to do about it 
serious ovements. 
I I 1 1 st 










the management has been 
the 
d 
sity has really 
to see some very 
ere. 
Let my see if there are 
As Bates? 
, I had some. I 'rn sorry. 
ed stion earlier 
I I d li you to respond 
s g i some leadership 
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1 the question of reliability. 
2 DR. FRAZER: I was attempting to answer in my 
3 comment that I had asked the Scientific and Academic Advisory 
4 Committee several months ago to make that their primary 
5 agenda item this year. And they're doing that. 
6 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Would you consider raising that 
7 with Congress, saying that this is an important issue that 
8 we're investigating and would suggest that the Congress might 
9 even want to look at this in a broader grouping? 
10 DR. FRAZER: I don't know what the outcome of that 
11 committee's report will be. 
12 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: This is an in-house situation 
13 and the question has been raised it might be better even from 
14 a broader national discussion and it would be important for 
15 the University to provide some leadership in that. 
16 DR. FRAZER: Well, it could be. I simply don't 
17 know. It's possible that the Committee's finding will be 
18 that they're not critical of the laboratories' handling of 
19 that issue. 
20 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: I guess I didn't make myself 
21 clear. You've got one ort going here. I'm saying we want 
22 to also focus at the national level, to say that we believe 
23 it's an important question. We're looking at it, we've got 
24 1 our own people, but we think it's of significant importance 
25 that the entire nation should look at it and it should be 
26 given even a potentially broader review than our own 
27 committee. 
28 DR. FRAZER: I think I just have to reseve judgment 
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very appr ate 1 I 
bit presumptuous at moment 
at it 
t I 
d feel a 
a special 
reason to ask to. We 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
would comment. 
reality is that the 
Can I ask 
Universi 
Dr. DeWitt if he 
and, you know, the 
s have indicated their willingness 
8 to continue and it looks like something will be worked out. 
9 What would you say -- and others may join in this. 




Legislature to do to 
oversight 
have been scus 
to get basical the kind of 
ions r , the kind of things that 
e , the concerns you've brought 












play to make sure 
the Congress, some ki 
information was 
we have a good presentation before 
peer review in terms of 
some check on the 
labs and e doi ? 
DR. DeWITT I great difficul giving anything 
specific to answer r ion, because I understand that 
the Regents exer ve great over all matters 
concerning Un sity. r e the state 
Legislature is pr i purse The Legislature 
can't exercise it action ersity for 
things it oves wo d unfortunate for 






stion would be 
e that pass a 
3 
1 very strong resolution pressing the Regents to finally 
2 last exercise some real oversight in all these matters 
3 we've been discussing here today. Whether it could go beyond 
4 any kind of legislative remedies, I just don't know. 
5 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Are there any suggestions for 
6 instance, I was under the impression that various people 
7 present testimony to Congress and some of that information is 
8 incorrect, we are told, some of that information is 
9 misleading. 
10 Is there any sort of built-in peer review of that? 
11 In other words, that information -- is there anything that we 
12 could copy that was -- like maybe, as the intelligence 
13 community does, we would require internal review before 
14 people spoke on behalf of the labs before these various 
15 committees. Do other people have some suggestions? 
16 DR. SCHWARTZ: On your last point -- I hope people 
17 in the lab will verify this -- it's my understanding that 
18 ' when laboratory officials go to Washington to testify before 
19 congressional hearings or to even high-level executive 
20 people, their presentations are in fact cleared through the 
21 upper management of the laboratory; exactly the opposite of 
22 what I think you're trying to get at. 
23 so, I think there is that kind of structure. The 
24 question is: Is there a way to counterbalance that, to 
25 broaden it? Could one create, insist on a kind of peer 
26 review system? 
27 I think that would be the most excellent thing that 
28 could be done. I would love to imagine that the University 
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that. not atu i ways to 
help make d be excellent. 
DR. DeWITT: Just one ick comment on the question 
of peer review or some ki 
laboratory officials to 
Down through 
r ew of statements made by 
U.S. Congress. 
years usually these statements made 
from the laboratory rectors and by associate directors and 
9 laboratory experts to members of Congress simply are made 
10 going to the congressional record and are not usually seen 
11 again. 
12 The laboratories a r ationship with, 
















friendly relations. or , 
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should be. 
i a t, I think, 
least a few members of 
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So, statements of 
to critics of 
ncludi some of 
ree rs it's 
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1 appropriate. Then, of course, occasionally we're called in, 
2 also, by Congress. I mor of this will happen. 
3 ASSEMBLYMAN BATES: Just one last thing. I was 
4 wondering if it would possible for people to supply us 
5 with maybe a list of questions that we could in fact request 
6 the University to examine, scientific questions that need to 
7 be debated and discussed in an open forum and have that 
8 returned to the Legislature with some kinds of 
9 recommendations. 
10 Maybe they would come back and say, this is not 
11 possible, there's too much debate. But at least where we 
12 could find some consensus of opinion around various issues 
13 like the reliability questions, the verification question; a 
14 number of pursuits that we could kind of request by 
15 resolution or some other method to have the University 






awful lot. Too 
r I ec 
as t 
s hearing. I didn't 
as I did. I learned an 
this discussion when I 
20 had my resolution, because would have been very helpful, I 
21 think. 
22 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: I certainly do appreciate you 
23 staying and the interest you've taken and the questions you 
24 have raised. 
25 Senator Rosenthal. 
26 SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Let me just make a couple of 
27 personal observations. 
28 If I my ce, I d suggest that the 
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1 University is probably not the one to do the oversight. But 
2 
3 
that not being necessari i e is t it seems to 
me that we ought to some are legi ative 
4 intent that the Legislature and the Regents need to have 
5 improved oversight of the laboratories' activities that 
6 requires the Regents to establish a nuclear weapons oversight 
7 committee which shall be responsible for reporting to the 
8 extent possible permitted by federal law information 
9 concerning the nuclear weapons development programs of 
10 Livermore and Los Alamos to the Regents and to the 
11 Legislature. 
12 It seems to me unless the Legislature is 
13 satisfied at some point that the job is being done well, then 
14 we will not do anything about it. While it's sometimes 










harmful to students, somet 
quickly than se 
I i we 
resolution an envir 
weapons designed by a testi 
detailed statement setti 
environmental 
nuclear weapons and we 
that so that, in, 
that gets attention much more 
d 
r e rt 
impact report for any nuclear 
project to also contain a 
for poss e adverse 
use or of those 
to have an urgency clause on 
s Legislature would be 
25 informed about 's taking place. 
26 We r ire envir impact reports on all kinds 
27 of other things. You can't construct a prison in downtown 
28 Los Angeles wi r irement and we're talking about 
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1 something which is certainly much more significant. 
2 So, it seems to me at least we should have a 
3 couple of spot b ls introduced to move in this particular 
4 direction. I'm certain there will be no shortage of 
5 positives for those kinds of issues. 
6 CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you so much, Senator 
7 Rosenthal. 
8 I think he states the case well. The Committee has 
9 been pondering as to which direction it should take. I'd 
10 like in the future -- whether near or far -- to reconvene a 
11 similar group to discuss what you see are the environmental 
12 effects of continuation of contracting with the Department of 
13 Energy. 
14 I am not satisfied that we touched on it hardly at 
15 all today. I am not satisfied that the University has shown 
16 any sensitivity to its social responsibility in that regard. 
17 Therefore, I think the suggestions that carne from Senator 
18 Rosenthal might have r place. 
19 In this last panel I heard about the Advisory 
20 Committee. I heard that you had a Health, Safety and 
21 Environmental Advisory Committee. But those are committees 
22 that have been established by the University. I think maybe 
23 it's now time that we 1 at the Legislature establishing 
24 committees. Certainly not to be composed of legislators, but 
25 to be composed of lay people with the expertise and probably 
26 some without could g ice and could have a base for 
27 
28 
understanding what happens wi 
The reason why I think 
these laboratories. 
1 people, too, is 
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represented. 
I not want 
ance; we 
188 
people to be 
we are best 
4 experts, legi ators But we are are icymakers and 
5 who we are are people who must hold some kind of 




are are people to a r making 
decisions. Therefore, we felt it was necessary to convene 
all of you here today. 
10 I want to commend and congratulate every single 
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1 administration would say: Is it our mission to continue the 
2 arms struggle or is it our mission to provide for you the 
3 best scientific input with social responsibility? 
4 I'm looking for that kind of balance and I'm 
5 thinking that you've created a world with the laboratories 
6 and this world is going to go on and so you must supply the 
7 Department of Energy and the Regents with the information 
8 that will continue the world in which you live. I'm a bit 
9 troubled by that. Because I do think that you in academia 
10 and we in the Legislature have a responsibility to say, let 
11 us raise some other questions. 








We have raised other questions. We have the input from the 
University as to how they go about maintaining the scientific 
research and development that they do. I think the whole 
question of reliability was probably addressed earlier in the 
day and I think that I'm not convinced that testing needs to 
continue based on the reliability factor. I'm not so sure if 
the University of California ought to be involved in the 
20 testing. 
21 I think it's legitimate to have the University of 
22 California involved. I think there's a public service there. 
23 I do think the caliber of people that get involved with the 
24 laboratory is far superior of probably what they're doing in 
25 other institutions, but I don't know if the testing aspects 
26 ought to be a part of that. 
27 This is information that all of us will have to 
28 admit we're not that familiar with. We certainly have our 






























feelings towards it. 
So, I see this as a beginning of the dialogue. 
Senator Rosenthal laid out some paths that we might take. 
We'll probably discuss these spot bills that he speaks of in 
the Committee and with our colleagues that are not on the 
Committee as to whether we need to proceed with them or not. 
But that gives you some idea of the thinking of the 
Committee. 
I certainly want to thank all of the people who are 
part of the Southern California Federation of Scientists and, 
in particular, John Bachar, Professor of Math at Cal State 
Long Beach, who brought the concept to my office and to the 
Committee, along with his colleagues. They have worked 
diligently and hard to get all of you here. 
I think this has been a very successful day and I 
guess a very beneficial use of the time on both sides, the 
Committee and the witnesses. 
So, I thank you and at four minutes to 5:00 we're 
going to adjourn. I would hope that those from the uc system 
' would address the proposals as you heard them described by 
Senator Rosenthal to my office in writing as we discuss 
whether we want to pursue them or not. 
so, I thank all of you for coming. 
kind of intelligent testimony we had here. 
the last of this kind of hearing. 
I appreciate the 
This will not be 
With that, the Health and Human Services Committee 
forum is adjourned. 
(Thereupon the hearing before the Senate Committee 






























on Health and Human Services was adjourned at 4:58 
p.m.) 
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